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Abstract 
Building a secure electronic voting system is a difficult task. The US Pentagon dropped their proposed online 
voting system which would have given overseas military personnel the opportunity to vote in the elections in 
2005, citing the inability to ensure the legitimacy of votes as the reason. There is however a new cry in the wild 
to deploy a voting blockchain. The blockchain serves as a public ledger of transactions which cannot be 
reversed. The all-important consensus of transaction (i.e. legitimate votes) is achieved through 'miners' agreeing 
to validate new records being added.  Whenever a new insertion is to be made e.g. votes, then a new transaction 
record is created by a voter adding details of their cast vote to the blockchain. Should it be deemed a valid 
transaction then the new vote is added to the end of the blockchain and remains there forever. What is neat 
about this solution is the fact that no centralized authority is needed to approve the votes but rather a majority 
consensus. Here everyone agrees on the final tally as they can count the votes themselves & because of the 
blockchain audit trail, anyone can verify that no votes were tampered with and no illegitimate votes were 
inserted. This paper discusses the application of blockchain to voting. 
Keywords: blockchain, e-voting, government, voting, electronic voting 
JEL Classifications: D72, D02 
 
1.   Introduction 
 Blockchains have become an important technology 
in a relatively short-time [1, 2, 3]. It does have major 
implications in future online systems ranging from 
finance to medicine to military. Very few domains will 
not have a blockchain deployed in the coming years. 
A blockchain is a distributed database that maintains 
an ever-growing list of data records secured from 
tampering or revision. It is de-centralised avoiding a 
single point of failure with the group working together 
to confirm legitimate new transactions [4]. It is 
composed of data structure blocks where each block 
holds batches of individual transactions and the 
results of any blockchain executables.  These blocks 
contain a timestamp and a link to a previous block. 
The blockchain therefore serves as a public ledger of 
transactions which cannot be reversed (or without 
great difficulty). Blockchain technology can transform 
key aspects of society such as smart contracts to make 
micropayments for use more cost effective or in the 
music industry to enable data sharing among the value 
chain from artist to final consumer realizing and 
releasing more value [5]. What is neat about 
blockchain is the fact that no   centralised   authority  
is  needed  to  approve  the  transaction but rather a 
majority consensus [6,7]. Now,  for the  first  time we 
can have a system of barter - a system of storage - a 
lottery system etc - running globally with no central 
ownership, semi-anonymous - yet full of trustworthy 
transactions which cannot be cheated. That really does 
change things in many domains [8].  
Adopting Distributed ledger technology (aka 
blockchain) is not simply a technological decision but 
also a business decision and therefore any real-world 
use case must also solve real problems for 
organizations which deploy one [9]. One of the most 
valid domains for a blockchain is for voting.  Building 
a secure electronic voting system is a difficult task. 
Many governments have tried to roll out electronic 
systems but example after example shows that there 
were flaws. Governments are keen to see an IT 
solution as the costs of elections are non-trivial and in 
recent years voter apathy has been on the increase, 
especially among the younger computer savvy 
generation. The importance of voting deems it a crucial 
system that must execute without failure. There is 
however a new hope in the creation of a decentralised 
platform which  can  address   many  of  the  
weaknesses  which  were inherent in traditional 
electronic voting systems.  
Of course, at this time, there are many who believe a 
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blockchain can be applied in most domains when, a Blockchain 
only makes sense when multiple mutually mistrusting entities wish 
to interact & change the state of a system and are not able to agree 
on an online trusted third party [10, 11]. Some will claim that the 
only true legitimate use case for a blockchain is cryptocurrencies 
however others think that the ledger’s decentralised, tamper-proof 
nature makes it safe enough to allow fraud-free online elections. 
An interesting side effect of a blockchain is that it could allow for 
continuous voting e.g. casting a vote every week or month. This 
paper explores the application of blockchain for electronic voting. 
2. The case for a blockchain for voting  
One of the most valid domains for a blockchain is for voting [12, 
13, 14, 15]. Blockchain distributes individual voting information 
across thousands of computers globally making it impossible to 
alter or delete votes once they have been cast. This approach 
promotes greater trust between voters and governments by 
protecting their data and privacy. Trust is inherently created by 
having the user in control over their data. Platforms like this allow 
allows citizens to cast their votes on smartphone apps, rather than 
having to queue up at polling stations. Implementing a blockchain 
does not require governments to completely rebuild their systems 
but rather their existing platforms can be re-modelled to fit. All 
signs point towards a shift towards decentralised remote 
participation as opposed to traditional centralised gatherings at 
public polling stations. 
A Blockchain architecture specifically addresses one of the most 
difficult factors challenging electoral integrity – trust. Blockchain 
ensures trust is distributed amongst a set of mutually distrustful 
parties, all of whom are potentially adversarial, that participate in 
jointly managing and maintaining the cryptographically secure 
digital trail of an election. By distributing trust in this way, 
blockchains create a trustless environment whereby the amount of 
trust required from those participating in an election is minimized. 
The major weakness of blockchain in providing a solution for most 
business domains is that storing data or large files on the 
blockchain a non-starter as it can barely sustain small strings of text 
that simply record a balance transfer between two parties. 
However, the Interplanetary File System (IPFS)1 is an interesting 
project that could provide much of the infrastructure needed for 
blockchain content storage as it provides a permanent, 
decentralized Web where links do not die, and no single entity 
controls the data. Organisations can add any data to it and in return 
receives a unique identifying hash. IPFS is a content-addressed 
system, in contrast to the Web, which is an IP-addressed system. It 
provides a decentralized way of storing files on a blockchain but 
giving more control, securely identifying content & providing rich 
programmatic interactions. It has potential but still in preliminary 
stages.  
Ultimately, any blockchain implementation for e-voting must 
satisfy as follows [16, 17, 18]. 
•   Public Verifiability Everyone involved can see the voting 
process (recorded on blockchain) & verify the election’s 
outcome.  
•   Individual Verifiability All voters can verify their ballot has 
been recorded in the final tally. 
•   Dependability & Consistency The blockchain should be non-
attackable and accept the same outcome of the election. 
•   Auditability The voting process on the blockchain is auditable 
after the election by the public or third-parties 
•   Anonymity All ballots have no connection with their voters (but 
each voter can verify their cast vote) 
•   Transparency The blockchains transparency ensure the 
procedure is open to public scrutiny. 
3. E-Voting Blockchain Projects  
Some projects which are currently seeking or have implemented 
e-voting implementations on Blockchain include the following:	  
3.1 Luxoft 
Luxoft Holding2, a global IT service provider of technology 
solutions aims to deliver an e-voting platform that enables the first 
consultative vote based on blockchain in the city of Zug, 
Switzerland. As one of the founding members of The Crypto 
Valley Association, which aims to build the world’s leading 
blockchain and cryptographic technology ecosystem, Luxoft 
partner with organizations working on government-based 
blockchain service solutions and invite them to jointly create 
Blockchain for Government Alliance. In the pursuit of driving the 
adoption of blockchain-based services in government, Luxoft is 
striving to establish a blockchain for government alliance and 
hence promote blockchain use-cases in public institutions. Zug 
already accepts cryptocurrency for services and has digitized the 
blockchain based solution e-Vote, including the platform itself, 
software and algorithms is built on Hyperledger Fabric. Integrated 
with Zug’s Ethereum-based digital ID registration application, 
residents are hereby allowed to cast votes on the blockchain. 
The solution claims to use an innovative encryption technology 
that anonymizes the votes and allows tamper-proof tally and secure 
audit. With the help from the Lucerne University of Applied 
Sciences and Arts, Amazon AWS and n’cloud.swiss, the platform 
is deployed on three different data centers in the cloud.  
Two of these are in Switzerland and one in Ireland. By distributing 
the data into three different data centers, security and data loss risks 
are distributed geographically for robustness. 
3.2 IIT Bandung 
IIT Bandung researchers [19] outline a recording of voting result 
using blockchain algorithm from every place of election. Unlike 
Bitcoin with its Proof of Work, they proposed a method based on 
a predetermined turn on the system for each node in the built of 
blockchain. This process begins when the voting process at each 
node has been completed. Before the election process begins, each 
node generates a private key and a public key. Public key of each 
node sent to all nodes listed in the election process, so each node 
has a public key list of all nodes. When the election occurs, each 
node gathers the election results from each voter. When the 
selection process is completed, the nodes will wait their turn to 
create the block. Upon arrival of the block on each node, then done 
verification to determine whether the block is valid. Once 
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validated, then the database is updated with the data in the block. 
After the database update, the node will check whether the node 
ID that was brought as a token is his or not. If the node gets a turn, 
it will create and submit a block that has been filled in digital 
signature to broadcast to all nodes by using turn rules in blockchain 
creation to avoid collision and ensure that all nodes into 
blockchain. The submitted block contains the id node, the next id 
node as used as the token, timestamp, voting result, hash of the 
previous node, and the digital signature of the node. 
The blockchain permission protocol used is a distributed record-
keeping system operated by known entities, in other words having 
the means to identify nodes that can control and update data 
together in achieving the participants trust goals. The known entity 
in this system is any node that has been registered before the 
process runs, with the public key on each node owned by all the 
nodes in the system. Any data that is broadcast by the node that 
gets a turn is always verified and updated its data by the recipient. 
The verification system performed by all receiving nodes can 
identify if there are previous hashes and / or public keys that are 
not registered in the database. The counter-time system becomes a 
parameter when there are nodes that have interference functioning 
in accordance with the design. Nodes that experience interference 
can perform manual data or system broadcast can be repeated to 
update data when the process has reached the last turn node. Each 
previous hash that is used by the block in the system has proven 
the same as the hash value on the calculation results using the data 
in the previous block. Each hash value in the previous block has 
been included in the calculation of hash values by the block that 
gets a turn on the system, making anyone who wants to change the 
data in the database will have difficulty because if one data is 
changed it must make changes to data on other block. 
3.3 Ethereum Blockchain Trustless Voting 
Fernado Lobato open sourced a voting system3 as a smart contract 
running on Ethereum that uses threshold keys and linkable ring 
signatures to provide a transparent and robust system that could 
be implemented for medium size elections. Each voter is in control 
and can monitor his vote while remain anonymous amongst a set 
of users. The protocol minimizes centralization using threshold 
cryptography which allows for the voting to be tallied by anybody 
and does not require every user to vote for tallying to be precise. 
The execution of the protocol via the Ethereum protocol. They 
deployed the contract to the Ethereum test network and provided 
some analysis on feasibility and costs in the supporting paper4. The 
voting scheme is divided into the following phases after being 
deployed on the blockchain. 
•   Setup - Election authority uploads all information about the 
election. Length of voting and registration periods, threshold key 
for voters to encrypt their votes and the voting options. 
•   Registration - At this phase any voter can go with the election 
authority and request his public key be included into the set of 
public keys eligible to vote. 
•   Voting - At this phase any previously registered voter and submit 
an encrypted vote with the threshold key published in the 
contract with a ring signature of all the public keys registered in 
the sub ring. 
•   Finished - Once the voting phase is over all the third parties 
holding secrets can submit them to the blockchain. When all the 
secrets are in the contract, anybody can download and 
reconstruct the private key. 
•   Ready to Tally - Anybody can tally the result of the election. 
The online repo contains Solidity contracts to represent election, 
Python scripts to compile and deploy., Javascript files for testing, a 
small web application to run the election scheme, Python program 
for working with linkable ring signatures and a Python program for 
working with threshold encryption. Development was done in a 
private Ethereum network deployed in two computers. The code 
has a set of scripts and documentation on how to recreate an 
Ethereum private network. The final tests were done in Ethereum 
official test network (Ropsten). There are 3 Ethereum test 
networks. Two of them use an alternative to Proof-of-Work called 
Proof-of-Authority where only certain nodes can mine transaction 
in a semi trusted environment that is not as energy consuming. 
They used Ropsten which mimics Ethereum current live network. 
3.4 Public Votes 
PublicVotes5 is a freely available simple voting application built 
with Meteor that utilizes the Ethereum Blockchain to create a 
provably fair and transparent voting system. All votes of 
participants are recorded (by proxy) into the Blockchain for the 
world to verify. The application is not fully decentralized, since the 
design goal was to create an application that is easy to use for 
people outside the Ethereum space. The entire platform is built on 
Meteor with one smart contract coded in Solidity that is used for 
placing a poll into the Blockchain and for casting the votes. Anyone 
with a small amount of Ether can create a poll. At PublicVotes, the 
creator of the poll pays for the creation of the poll and for all votes.  
A poll consists of the following information: 
•   Title: Mostly a question that indicates what the users are voting 
about.  
•   Description: A more comprehensive description that explains to 
the users what the vote is exactly about.  
•   Options: The actual voting options for the poll. 
•   Public Poll: The user can choose if the poll should be public or 
not. If the poll is private, only people with the link can participate 
in the vote. 
•   Vote Limit: Limits the number of people that can participate in 
the poll.  
•   Time Limit: This is a requirement as the account will eventually 
run out of Ether.  
Once the creator has entered this information, he/she is required 
to send a specified amount (0.2 Ether to be exact) of Ether to an 
address. All the accounts are generated on the client. This account 
is then stored in a local MongoDB collection and will be used for 
all future votes. Once the Ether have been received at the specified 
address, the poll is ready to go live and be deployed onto the 
Ethereum Blockchain. Once the contract has been mined, the poll 
will go live, and people can start voting. Once a vote has been 
received, the smart contract will record the vote into the 
Blockchain’s event log. After voting, the user is redirected to 
/voted where there are statistics about the poll and the people who 
have voted. 
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3.5  Votem Proof of Vote  
Votem Corp is a three-year-old blockchain-based mobile voting 
headquartered in Cleveland, Ohio. They have created a Proof of 
Vote protocol6, an end-to-end voter verifiable (E2E) digital voting 
system that uses blockchain to ensure the verifiability, security, and 
transparency of an election. The protocol leverages an ElGamal re-
encryption mix-net for anonymity, a multi-signature scheme for 
voter authentication and authorization, and verifiable distributed 
key generation and verifiable decryption for vote encryption and 
decryption. Their protocol is like other end-to-end voter verifiable 
(E2E) voting systems [18] in that: 
•   Voters encrypt their vote with an election-specific public key, 
post it to a public repository of votes, and achieve anonymity via 
a homomorphic cryptosystem. 
•   To achieve anonymity, the set of encrypted ballots is processed 
via a homomorphic cryptosystem and tallied with proofs of 
correct operations.  
Proof of Vote differentiates itself from other voting and 
governance protocols by being designed from the ground up to 
explicitly optimize for the maximum level of verifiability, 
accessibility, security, and transparency of an election system 
deployed in the real world. It offers substantial advantages over 
more traditional E2E systems [20] via the use of blockchain and a 
multi-party signature scheme for voter authentication and 
authorization, aiming to be a mature and tried technological 
blueprint for how societies, governments, and organizations can 
build election systems and processes. Furthermore, Proof of Vote 
leverages blockchain to perform verifiable distributed key 
generation (for generating an election's public key), verifiable vote 
anonymization via mix-networks, and verifiable vote decryption. 
Every action that takes place as part of the Proof of Vote Protocol 
is realized as a transaction on the blockchain. This means that every 
action that takes places is verified in real-time by the entirety of the 
blockchain network and is inviolable once the transaction that 
represents that action is written to the blockchain. Furthermore, 
every action by a voter is fully visible to the voter and to every node 
at any time, maximizing visibility into an ongoing election without 
sacrificing the voter’s anonymity. 
4. Blockchain Types suitable for Voting  
The major weakness of blockchain in providing a solution for most 
business domains is that storing data or large files on the 
blockchain a non-starter as it can barely sustain small strings of text 
that simply record a balance transfer between two parties [21, 22]. 
However, the Interplanetary File System (IPFS)7 is an interesting 
project that could provide much of the infrastructure needed for 
storing data on the blockchain as it provides a permanent, 
decentralized Web where links do not die, and no single entity 
controls the data. Organisations can add any data to it and in return 
receives a unique identifying hash. IPFS is a content-addressed 
system, in contrast to the Web, which is an IP-addressed system. It 
provides a decentralized way of storing files on a blockchain but 
giving more control, securely identifying content & providing rich 
programmatic interactions. It has potential but still in initial stages. 
A permissioned public shared blockchain would allow for the 
casting of votes quickly with prominent levels of trust and 
ultimately provide real-time publicly verifiable casting of votes by 
all engaged parties. It is therefore envisaged that a public 
permissioned ledger could be most applicable for e-voting. What 
makes the deployment of a permissioned public blockchain most 
applicable here is that we have a finite number of trusted parties 
who must be included in the blockchain for it to work e.g. voters, 
neutral observers & political organisations.  A blockchain is 
suitable for several reasons which are not always the case when it 
comes to blockchain proposals. Here a blockchain would allow the 
casting of votes, the tallying and the verification of votes from the 
point of creation through the system of release and distribution. 
The assets are created from the beginning in a digital format and 
relate to the casting of votes. There is no requirement for 
millisecond transaction speeds for managing the assets. The 
solution is about allowing trusted third parties to cast votes and is, 
therefore, a good match for blockchain. Shared write access is 
required so that all parties can have a transparent record of what 
has occurred and when. This provides irrefutable proof that a cast 
vote is associated with an individual [23, 24]. 
Blockchain therefore looks like a viable solution to ease the 
strictures of existing traditional centralised solutions, however in 
practice what would be needed is the bringing together of 
representatives of all the activities in the voting value chain, from 
individual voters to the government agencies.  
5. Conclusion 
A valid route for an e-voting blockchain is through a permissioned 
public shared ledger. A permissioned, public, shared blockchain is 
a form of hybrid system that provide for situations where 
whitelisted access is required but all the transactions are viewable 
by the public. It applies here where only eligible voters can write to 
the network, but all transactions (i.e. votes) can be verified. A viable 
blockchain is Hyperledger Fabric which also have LevelDB which 
is a key value database allowing storage of data in the blockchain 
[25].  
The Blockchains most compelling use cases are in areas such as 
cryptocurrencies, harvesting unused computer processors or e-
voting where in each case, all parties involved are untrusted and 
transactions must be immutable. A permissioned, public, shared 
blockchain is a form of hybrid system that provide for situations 
where whitelisted access is required but all the transactions are 
viewable by the public. This provides the transparency needed in 
democracies. It applies here where only key players within the 
voting ecosystem can write to the network, but all transactions can 
be verified. A viable blockchain is Hyperledger Fabric which also 
have LevelDB which is a key value database allowing storage of 
data in the blockchain. The Interplanetary File System (IPFS) could 
be also be a feasible route as you can address substantial amounts 
of data with IPFS which is not the case with all blockchains which 
are concerned with transaction validation as opposed to storage of 
data [26]. 
E-voting however does bring some new problems such as ensuring 
privacy especially in the case of public permission less blockchains 
but there are solutions for that [27, 28, 29, 30]. Other problems 
include the speed by which transactions can be verified. For 
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instance, at this time Bitcoin and Ethereum can only process < 25 
transactions per second compared, for instance, to Visa or 
Mastercard's thousands per second. This is not to say some 
countries have not experimented with blockchain for voting. In 
March, Sierra Leone recorded votes at 70% of the polling to the 
blockchain using a technology from Agora which anonymously 
stored votes in an immutable ledger. It provided instant access to 
the election results. Others such as Voatz, a startup out of Boston 
are building a platform for blockchain voting and are starting to 
experiment with New England open town meetings. The Nasdaq 
also recently ruled the Estonia experiment safe enough to allow 
firms to start using blockchain for proxy voting.  So blockchain 
may be championed as the solution to many problems in vain, but 
one domain where it might make sense in the end - is electronic 
voting. 
1.   https://ipfs.io 
2.   https://www.luxoft.com/ 
3.   https://github.com/fernandolobato/decentralized-blockchain-voting 
4.   http://aleph.com.mx/docs/blockchain_voting.pdf 
5.   https://github.com/domschiener/publicvotes/blob/master/contracts/contrac
t.sol 
6.   https://github.com/votem/proof-of-vote 
7.   https://ipfs.io 
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